2017级美国研究硕士论文摘要

 

[1] 陈丹丹

导师姓名：陈崛斌

中文题目：美国国会拉美裔实质性代表研究----自由移民政策的力量

英文题目：Latino Substantive Representation in the U.S. Congress---Toward a Liberated Immigration Policy

摘要

2003年，拉美裔人口已成为美国最大的少数族裔。随着美国人口组成的变化，拉美裔移民问题已成为政治舞台上的热门话题。特朗普上台后移民政策逐渐成为拉美裔人民的灾难，美国政治中越来越多的反拉美裔移民言论使得移民政策成为拉美裔的首要利益关注。随着更多拉美裔议员入选国会，其比重在最新的116届国会达到最高峰。在这种语境下，人们越来越关注拉美裔议员与拉美裔利益之间的互动关系，即不断改善的描述性代表是否意味拉美裔议员能够实质性代表拉美裔利益？拉美裔国会议员是否比非拉丁裔议员更好地代表拉丁裔的移民权益？

本研究以第115届和116届国会的拉美裔众议员为研究对象来分析拉美裔描述性代表与实质性代表之间的关系。通过收集和分析拉美裔众议员有关移民法案的发起和国会演讲的数据，本文就拉美裔众议员对拉美裔的实质性代表行为和程度进行了研究。移民法案发起是实质性代表研究中被广泛分析的行为，它可以有效说明拉美裔众议员是否在政治行为中反映拉美裔利益偏好。而国会演讲是检验实质性代表的重要渠道，并提供对拉美裔众议员行为的重要见解，能够更加具体地了解拉美裔众议员行为背后的逻辑。

本研究通过对移民法案的发起和国会演说进行了定性和定量分析，发现拉美裔众议员相比较非拉美裔议员而言往往更积极地通过法案发起来代表拉美裔移民利益，他们在演说过程中更一致地表达了拉美裔的观点和顾虑。研究证明，拉美裔议员通过赞助更多的移民法案，是解放移民政策的中坚力量。此外，拉美裔国会议员，不论地区，种族血统和意识形态，在代表移民利益方面已经逐渐形成一股一致的团结力量。而这种贡献在国会演讲中对拉美裔实质性代表至关重要。基于此，本文认为拉美裔议员的描述性代表对于实质性代表拉美裔移民利益至关重要，拉美裔议员在政策议程制定和审议过程中大大增强了解放拉美裔移民政策的实现可能。

关键词：美国国会， 拉美裔众议员， 移民法案，实质性代表

Abstract

In 2003, the Latinos have become the largest minority in the United States.  With such demographic changes, Latino immigration issue has become a hot political topic ever since Trump took office. Trump’s ascent to power has made immigration policies a disaster for Latino immigrants and the increasing anti-Latino rhetoric in American politics have put immigration policies on the top of priorities of Latino community. With more Latino representatives elected to Congress has come increased interest in how Latino immigration interests are represented in Congress. Whether the improved Latino descriptive representation in congress enhances substantive representation in general and with regard to immigration policies in particular? Are Latinos better represented by Latino representatives than non-Latino representatives? The role that Latino representatives play to substantively representing Latino is being examined carefully in this paper.

In this study, Latino representatives in the 115th and 116th congresses are studied to access and evaluate the relationship between Latino descriptive representation and substantive representation. Data of immigration bill sponsorship and floor speeches are collected to examine substantive representation of Latino representatives. Bill sponsorship, a widely analyzed behavior in representation research, illustrates Latino representatives’ role in prioritizing policies that match Latino interests and reflect Latino preferences. Floor speeches can provide specific windows on representative patterns and offer important insight into the mindset and behaviors of Latino representation. Using a multi-method approach that included qualitative and quantitative analyses of immigration bill sponsorship and floor speeches, this study finds that Latino representatives are more active in representing Latino immigration issues through bill sponsorship and they speak for Latino perspectives during floor speeches more consistently. This study finds that Latino representatives have made more focused efforts to liberate immigration policy. Furthermore Latino representatives are showing a tendency to form a consistent frontier in representing immigration interest regardless of their region, ethnic origin, and ideology. Such united contributions are essential to Latino community during congressional floor speeches. This study concluded that Latino descriptive representatives are essential to substantive Latino representation and Latino representatives substantially enhances Latino representation in the process of policy agenda setting and deliberation.

Key Words: Latino representatives, substantive representation, immigration bill sponsorship, floor speeches

 

[2] 陈创

导师姓名：李期铿

中文题目：美国移民改革立法僵局——第99届和109届国会对比研究

英文题目：The Legislative Gridlock of Immigration Reform in the US: Comparing the 99th and the 109th Congress

摘要

移民改革是美国近年来最具争议性的话题之一。国会已通过了三部综合性移民改革法案，分别是《1924年国家起源法案》、《1965年移民和国籍法案》和《1986年移民改革和控制法》。自1986年以来，国会若干次综合性移民改革立法尝试均宣告失败，其中第109届国会的H.R.4437和S.2611被认为是最引人注目的立法尝试。本文从党间分歧和党内分歧的两个维度入手，通过对比第99届国会S.1200（即《1986年移民改革和控制法》）和第109届H.R.4437和S.2611的立法过程，分析这两个时期出现不同结果的原因。本文主要采用了文献分析法、对比研究法和历史研究法，通过分析《国会记录》的议员讲话文本，结合记名投票结果等相关信息，得出以下结论。

在党间分歧维度，第109届国会两党在综合性移民改革法案上的分歧远大于在普通法案上的分歧，而第99届国会两党在两种法案上的分歧不大。从两党成员的角度分析，从第99届到第109届，按照党派属性进行投票的议员比例上升，党间分歧显著扩大。第109届国会极化的程度也远高于第99届，参议院两党在这个议题上并未结成巩固的联盟，小范围的团结仅限于共和党自由派和民主党。而且，国会在不同议题上极化的程度不一，移民议题上极化程度的波动远高于其他主要议题。

在党内分歧维度，S.1200没有受到党内分歧的明显影响，但是H.R.4437和S.2611更多地受到了共和党内部分歧的负面影响。参议院和众议院通过了各自版本的综合性移民改革法案，不愿互相妥协。众议院共和党人和参议院共和党保守派更加支持H.R.4437，而两院民主党人和参议院共和党自由派更加支持S.2611，两院之间的分歧实质上来源于共和党内部的斗争。众议院共和党人比参议院共和党人更加支持H.R.4437；参议院南方共和党人更加支持H.R.4437，而北方共和党人更加支持S.2611。多种因素叠加，导致第109届国会综合性移民改革最终失败。

总的来说，第99届国会综合性移民改革立法尝试主要受党间分歧的影响，两党结成的巩固联盟压过了这种分歧的负面影响，使得法案最终成功，而第109届国会综合性移民改革立法僵局受到了党间分歧和共和党内部分歧的双重巨大影响，且分歧程度远高于第99届国会，这导致了第109届的综合性移民改革立法尝试以失败告终。本文有利于增进对美国国会移民立法过程的理解，理清1986年之后美国国会对移民议题态度的变化，以及党派分歧对移民立法的影响程度，以便对解读当前美国国会移民改革困境提供一些启示。

关键词：移民改革；国会；立法；党派分歧

 

Abstract

Immigration reform has been one of the most controversial topics in the U.S. in recent years. The Congress has passed three comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) bills: the National Origins Act of 1924, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Since 1986, several legislative attempts of CIR bills have failed in the Congress, among which H.R.4437 and S.2611 in the 109^th Congress were said to be the most noticeable. Through comparing the legislation of S.1200 (i.e. the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986) in the 99^th and H.R.4437 and S.2611 in the 109^th Congress from the dimension of inter-party division and the dimension of intra-party division, this thesis explores why the legislative attempts of CIR bills in the two periods yielded distinct results. Mainly by document analysis, historical and comparative study methods, this thesis draws the following conclusions by analyzing the text of congresspersons’ speeches and related information like roll call vote records.

On the first dimension, in the 109^th Congress the two parties were more divergent in CIR bills than in other bills, whereas in the 99^th Congress the divergence between the two parties in the two types of bills was not significant. From the perspective of party members, the percentages of Congressmembers voting along the party line increased remarkably from the 99^th Congress to the 109^th, meaning the discord between the two parties increased tremendously. Furthermore, the Congress was more polarized in the 109^th Congress than in the 99^th. The two parties in the Senate did not form a solid coalition, with the small-scale unity limited to the liberal side of Republicans and Democrats. Besides, the degrees of polarization on different issues in the Congress were different. The fluctuation of the degree of polarization on the issue of immigration was far more dramatic than that on other major issues.

On the second dimension, the legislation of S.1200 in the 99^th Congress was not considerably influenced by intra-party division. But the legislation of H.R.4437 and S.2611 were more negatively influenced by internal conflicts of the Republican Party. The two chambers of the 109^th Congress passed their own versions of CIR bills, unwilling to compromise. House Republicans and the conservative side of Senate Republicans supported H.R.4437 more, whereas Democrats from the two chambers and the liberal side of Senate Republicans endorsed S.2611 more. The conflicts between the two chambers actually originated in the internal dissension of the Republican Party. House Republicans supported H.R.4437 more than Senate Republicans did. In the Senate, Republicans from the Southern States supported H.R.4437 more, while those from the Northern States preferred S.2611. With various factors combined, the legislative attempts of immigration reform in the 109^th Congress finally failed.

In short, the success of the legislative attempts of comprehensive immigration reform in the 99^th Congress were attributed to the solid bipartisan coalition overshadowing the negative impacts of inter-party divisions by which the bills were majorly influenced, whereas the legislative gridlock of that in the 109^th Congress was significantly influenced by both inter-party divisions and intra-party divisions of the Republicans. The divisions in the latter period were far sharper than that in the former period, which resulted in the final failure of the legislative attempts of comprehensive immigration reform in the 109^th Congress. This thesis contributes to the understanding of the immigration legislation process in the U.S. Congress, the changes of attitudes of the U.S. Congress toward immigration issues since 1986, and the influence of party divisions on immigration legislation, so as to proffer some inspiration for the interpretation of the contemporary dilemma of immigration reform in the U.S. Congress.

Key words: immigration reform; Congress; legislation; party division

 

[3] 王芯莹

导师姓名：李莉文

中文题目：特朗普执政时期美国联邦政府停摆的原因分析

英文题目：Why Federal Government Shut Down during the Trump Administration?

摘要

由于财政断流而造成的政府停摆在美国历史上屡见不鲜，而美国分权制衡的制度又使得这一危机难以得到根本解决。自1980年卡特政府第一次“关门”以来，美国联邦政府所经历的停摆已有16次，而这其中绝大多数都发生在分裂政府时期。两党相争作为美国政治体制的重要特点，同时也贯穿了每次政府停摆。

在这个背景下，特朗普执政时期的两次政府停摆则因其具备的不同以往的新特点而引起了广泛关注。首先，特朗普政府在停摆发生之时并非分裂政府，总统以及国会多数党均为共和党，这是自1980年卡特政府停摆后38年里出现的第一次一致政府下的停摆。其次，2018-2019年联邦政府停摆，即特朗普政府的第二次停摆，共历时35天，是美国历史上为期最长的一次停摆。这些都使得特朗普执政时期的政府停摆具有研究的意义和价值。

本文旨在对特朗普政府第二次停摆的原因进行分析，借助Nierenberg的谈判需求理论框架，聚焦财政预算谈判中作为主要谈判方的民主党与共和党、以及党内人士的不同需求，为其不同的立场及观点做出解释。本文的论点及论据主要来源于对相关政府文件、媒体报道、议员说辞等做出的文本分析。

此次政府停摆的关键在于两党对于特朗普提出的57亿美元的边境墙拨款存在异议。一方面，两党选民结构在近几十年内不断变化，为了自身的生存与发展，两党对于移民问题以及边境墙的建立表现出截然相反的态度。另一方面，共和党内部对于边境墙拨款以及“核选项”的使用也出现了分歧，这使得共和党丧失了国会两院多数党的优势，难以顺利通过财政预算并最终导致了联邦政府的停摆。在政府停摆的后期阶段，国家恢复秩序的需求以及美国民众对于回归正常生活的需求越来越强，促使两党做出妥协，结束了此次停摆。

关键词：政府停摆、谈判需求理论、边境墙拨款、移民问题、两党之争

Abstract

Government shutdowns caused by funding gap have frequently occurred in American history, and the U.S. system of check and balance makes it difficult to thoroughly resolve this problem. Since the Carter administration first shut down the government in 1980, the U.S. federal government has experienced 16 shutdowns in total, the vast majority of which have occurred under the split government. Party struggle, as an important feature of the American political system, also runs through every government shutdown.

In this context, the two government shutdowns under the Trump administration have attracted widespread attention due to their new characteristics. Firstly, the U.S. government was not in the split state when the shutdown began. The President and the majority party in Congress were both Republicans. This is the first unified government shutdown in the 38 years after the Carter government shutdown in 1980. Secondly, the 2018-2019 federal government shutdown, which is the second shutdown under the Trump administration, has lasted for 35 days, appearing to be the longest government shutdown in American history. All the above makes the Trump government shutdown worth discussing.

This thesis attempts to analyze the reasons for the second government shutdown under the Trump administration. By using Nierenberg’s Need Theory of Negotiation, this thesis will focus on the different needs of the Democratic and Republican parties as well as some of their members in the budget negotiation, and make explanations for their distinct attitudes. And the arguments mainly come from the textual analysis of relevant government documents, media reports and Congressional members’ words, etc.

The trigger for the government shutdown is the dispute between the two parties over Trump’s $ 5.7 billion border wall appropriation proposed in the budget bill. On the one hand, the demographic structure of both parties have changed rapidly in the past few decades. For the survival and development of their own, both parties showed entirely different attitudes towards immigration issue and border wall building.

On the other hand, the internal disagreement of the Republican party on the border wall as well as the use of “nuclear option” made it lose the advantage of being the majority party in both Houses in the Congress, which also made it hard for passing the budget bill and led to the long government shutdown. At the final stage of the shutdown, the need of the nation to restore order and the need of Americans for security and normal life became increasingly significant, leading to the compromise the both parties and the end of the shutdown.

Key words: government shutdown, Need Theory of Negotiation, border wall appropriation, immigration issue, party struggle

 

[4] 杨博源

导师姓名：陈崛斌

中文题目：特朗普政府时期中美网络安全合作失败过程与原因探析

英文题目：Failed China-U.S. Cybersecurity Cooperation under Trump: How and Why

摘要

在当今国际社会中，网络安全问题愈发受到关注，中美网络安全合作更是这一领 域的重要议题。中美两国曾经在多种国际机制框架内试图推进网络安全合作。在奥巴马政府时期，两国也曾达成诸多双边协议，初步建立了对话机制，取得了卓越的成效。然而，特朗普政府上台后，中美网络安全合作戛然而止。本文关注的主要问题就在于此：特朗普政府时期中美网络安全合作为何无法维持和推进？

本文采用罗伯特·基欧汉的制度自由主义作为理论框架。基欧汉认为，有效的国际机制能够促进国际合作，国际机制的有效性又建立在稳定的相互依赖关系之上，而相互依赖关系受制于三个影响因素：敏感性和脆弱性、议题联系和多渠道沟通。本文主要采用话语分析的研究方法，着重选取政府文件与报告、新闻报道、相关国际机制信息等材料来分析中美双方在网络安全问题上的诉求及中美网络安全合作的困境。

本文认为，既有国际机制无法有效促进中美网络安全合作，主要是由于存在以下四个方面存在缺陷。第一，联合国框架下的网络安全机制仍属新生事物，机制建设仍有待完善。在这种不完善的机制下，中美在网络安全问题上存在根本分歧，难以就国际规范达成共识。第二，在其他国际多边经济机制中，网络安全问题往往居于次要地位，且偏向于关注网络安全问题经济的一面。第三，在互联网非政府组织中，主要问题是政府参与度不够，非政府组织对政府行为的影响有限。第四，虽然中美双方曾在奥巴马执政时期建立了一些网络安全双边对话机制，但是由于缺乏退出机制限制、且两国派出的代表在专业性和级别上也不对等，因此效果有限。

通过分析特朗普政府有关网络安全议题的文件和报告，本文认为这种机制失效的根源在于特朗普上台后中美符合相互依赖的变化。首先，由于中国在高科技领域和尖端制造业的快速发展，美国对中国敏感性增强。特朗普政府把中国视作“竞争对手”而非伙伴，整体对华政策偏向强硬派。又由于在中美相互依赖中，中国对美国的脆弱性更强，因此特朗普政府从这种不对称相互依赖中获得了权力，并有足够意愿对中国运用这种权力。其次，特朗普政府采用议题联系策略，强化了网络安全问题中的国家安全维度，将其政治化，这有别于此前中美双方都强调网络安全的技术层面解决方案的做法。最后，由于特朗普政府介入过多政治手段，给中美网络安全合作其他渠道设障，导致非政府合作渠道受阻。

对中国来说，解决此问题有三种对应方案。第一，降低自身对美国的脆弱性。中国可以通过进一步增强自主研发能力降低对美国高科技产品的依赖，或者与其他国家合作，建立有别于美国主张的国际网络安全规范。第二，中国继续坚持技术问题和政治问题脱钩，拒绝将中美网络安全争端政治化。第三，中美应该尝试从非官方、低层级的联系开始恢复，并保证仍然有效的联系渠道不被阻隔。

关键词：网络安全；中美合作；特朗普政府；复合相互依赖；政治化

Abstract

As a new domain for international cooperation and competition, the cyberspace and its security have been drawing more and more attention from all the countries. In cyberspace, China-U.S. cooperation and competition on cybersecurity are very important. China and the United States once made great efforts to realize bilateral cybersecurity cooperation within the frameworks of many international regimes. During the Obama Administration, China and the U.S. reached a series of agreements, built the dialogue mechanism and achieved remarkable accomplishments. However, after President Trump took office, the China-U.S. cybersecurity cooperation fell into suspension. This dissertation is an inquiry into this question: Why China and the United States can’t sustain and continue the cooperation on cybersecurity during the Trump administration?

In order to answer this question, this research adopts Robert Keohane’s institutional liberalism as theoretical framework. According to Keohane, international cooperation can be facilitated by functional international regimes. Functional international regimes are built on stable interdependence relationship, which is affected by three factors: sensitivity and vulnerability, issue-linkage and multiple channels. Discourse analysis is selected as the research method. Materials including key official documents, mainstream coverage and basic information about international regimes are adopted to analyze the resorts of China and the U.S. on cybersecurity issue and the obstacles to their cooperation in this field.

Existing international regimes have failed to facilitate the U.S.-China cybersecurity cooperation due to the following flaws. First, cybersecurity regimes under the UN framework are still a working process, far from be perfect, unable to reconcile the essential V divergences between China and the United States on cybersecurity issue. Such divergences complicate the efforts on both sides to reach any consensus on establishing international norms. Second, in other international economic multilateral regimes, the cybersecurity problem is usually put to the sideline of the agenda. Besides, these regimes, by nature, is more inclined to prioritize the economic dimension of cybersecurity. Third, in cyberspace oriented NGOs, governmental participation is often half-hearted with little, if not none, dedication. The limited influence of NGOs on government behavior has led their rather insightful recommendations lay futile. Fourth, although China and the United States did build a dialogue mechanism on cybersecurity during the Obama Administration, this regime, for its lack of provisions on the withdrawal, plays no restrictive role in case a signatory wishes to leave the pack. Moreover, the actual policy significance of the representatives from both sides is marginal due to the non-equivalence in terms of expertise and seniority.

By analyzing the Trump Administration’s government documents and reports on cybersecurity issue, this thesis argues that the root cause of the regime dysfunction lies in changing China-U.S. complex interdependence. First, the United States has become more sensitive to China’s leaps and bounds in high-technology and advanced manufacturing. The Trump Administration is determined to perceive China as a “competitor” rather than a partner like Obama did and has, accordingly, toughened its overall stance toward China. Moreover, since China has greater vulnerability than America in China-U.S. complex interdependence, the Trump Administration gains power over China from this asymmetric interdependence and has the will to make full use of it when dealing with China. Second, the Trump Administration adopts the issue-linkage strategy to politicize cybersecurity, especially by prioritizing the national security dimension of cybersecurity, which is a marked diversion from the previous bilateral consensus that cybersecurity is primarily an issue with a technological solution. Third, the multiple channels between China and the United States are obstructed due to Trump’s excessive political interference; that is, various unofficial but once functional channels for cooperation are blocked.

Against this backdrop, China has three options. First, China can decrease its vulnerability to the United States by continuing its development in advanced manufacturing and further reducing its dependence on American high-tech products, or by cooperating with other states to establish international cybersecurity norms exclusive of the United States. Second, China continues to insist on and work on open-source technological solutions to the cybersecurity problem. Third, China and the United States should endeavor to restart the connections, and probably first at low levels.

Key Words: Cybersecurity, China-U.S. cooperation, the Trump Administration, complex interdependence, politicization.

 

[5] 冯家顺

导师姓名：闫循华

中文题目：特朗普政府对国外网络安全威胁的应对---新古典现实主义视角

英文题目：U.S. Responses to Foreign Cybersecurity Threats during the Trump Administration: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation

摘要

特朗普自当选美国总统以来，对美国的网络安全战略进行了一系列调整，在网络安全战略的目标，手段以及网络安全重点方面相较奥巴马政府有很大不同，其中最引人注目的就是带有浓厚的“大国竞争”印记。针对来自中国和俄罗斯的网络威胁，特朗普政府采取了一系列更富“进攻性”的网络安全政策，比如将中国高科技企业华为列入“实体清单”以及针对俄罗斯干预2016年美国大选而制裁一系列个人及实体。当前国内外学术界普遍重点研究特朗普本人对于美国网络安全政策制定的影响，而忽略了国际、国内因素的影响。基于此，本文致力于研究特朗普政府出台的一系列惩罚性网络安全政策背后的机制。

本文借助新古典现实主义构建分析的理论框架，关注国际和国内两个层次，并且突出美国精英认知以及国内制度，尤其是总统与国会之间的互动在国内层面发挥的作用。本文以中国和俄罗斯为例，着眼于特朗普政府出台的一系列政策、战略、法律，以及包括行政令以及总统指令在内的总统文件，通过案例分析以及文本分析建立国际因素和国内因素的互动，以及国内网络安全互动的联系。

研究结果发现：特朗普政府针对中国和俄罗斯出台的一系列惩罚性政策背后，是国内精英认知与权力互动的结果，精英认知的一致与否形成了国内权力互动的不同模式。在中国华为问题上，美国精英层一致认为华为对美国国家安全构成威胁，因此在国会立法以及特朗普政府政策制定方面运行通畅，立法与行政两层相互合作，促进华为禁令的出台；针对俄罗斯干预美国2016年总统大选问题，美国精英层就俄罗斯干预大选、特朗普勾结俄罗斯政府方面存在分歧。特朗普以及其共和党内的部分支持者否认上述指控，而民主党人以及特朗普的党内反对者认为俄罗斯干预美国大选对美国民主体系以及国家安全构成实实在在的威胁，继而要求严厉的对俄制裁。国内精英层面的分歧导致制裁俄罗斯干预大选的法案频频流产，以及特朗普政府在落实政策上的懈怠。

通过构建美国网络安全政策制定的解释框架，本文弥补了国内针对美国政府网络安全政策分析的系统性缺失，对更全面地理解特朗普政府的络安全政策调整具有借鉴意义。

关键词：网络安全，精英认知，权力互动，华为，美国大选

Abstract

The Trump administration has made a series of adjustments on the U.S. cybersecurity strategy after the 2016 presidential election, which is in many ways different from the Obama administration, and the most striking feature is “Great Power Competition.” The Trump administration has adopted a series of “offensive” cybersecurity policies in response to threat from China and Russia. For example, the administration added Chinese technology enterprise Huawei into “Entity List”, and imposed a series of sanctions on individuals and entities related to Russian meddling with the 2016 presidential election. The existing research focus on the Trumpian characteristics in his cybersecurity policy at large, while neglect the contribution of international and domestic factors. Against this background, this paper seeks to explain the mechanism behind the punitive cybersecurity polices issued by the Trump administration.

Based on a Neoclassical Realist framework, this paper attaches great importance to the domestic and international factors, and focuses on the role domestic elites’ perception, and domestic institutions, particularly interactions between the President and Congress, play in policymaking. With cases studies of China and Russia, this paper explores the interactions between international and domestic levels, and analyzes the role domestic institutions play in cybersecurity policymaking using textual analysis of the Trump administration’s cybersecurity policies, strategies, legislations, and other presidential documents such as executive orders and presidential directives, etc.

This paper argues that elite perception and interactions between domestic institutions are accountable for the punitive cybersecurity policies adopted by the Trump administration. The cohesiveness of elite perception leads to different patterns of interactions among domestic institutions, especially between the legislature and the executive branch. In the case of China, a cohesive perception can be found among the political elites, that Huawei posed a national security threat to the United States, which leads to an active congressional legislation and policymaking in the Trump administration. The executive branch and legislative worked together to formulate the ban on Huawei. In the case of Russia, the political elites are dissident and divided on Russian interference with the 2016 presidential election and Trump’s collusion with the Russian government. Trump and his Republican-supporters dismiss the above accusations, whereas Democrats and some Republicans in Congress regard Russia as severe threat to the U.S. democratic system and national security, thereby requiring harsh policies against Russia. The disagreement resulted in the abortion of a series of bills aimed at deterring the United States from Russian cybersecurity threat, and the weak policy implementation of the Trump administration.

This paper contributes to the academic discussions on reasons behind the U.S. cybersecurity policy adjustments by filling the void of a systematic analytical framework, and may help readers to have a more comprehensive understanding of why and how the Trump administration makes cybersecurity adjustments

Key words: Cybersecurity, Elites’ perception, Domestic institutions, Huawei, Presidential election

 

[6] 汤妮

导师姓名：闫循华

中文题目：关于美国2002年决定在阿富汗战场采取“轻脚印”战略的官僚政治研究

英文题目：A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the US Adoption of the Light Footprint Approach in Afghanistan in 2002

摘要

美国在阿富汗的战争已经持续了18年之久，而美国在推翻塔利班政权后在阿富汗战场采取的“轻脚印战略”时常被视为是导致战争拖延至今的原因之一，然而却少有人探究美国政府当年为何决定在阿富汗采用该战略。事实上，后者是个很值得研究的问题。即使这一战略与战争现状无关，仅仅作为美国在后塔利班时代在阿富汗战场最早期的战略性决策，其成因也值得探究。通过理解这一战略性决策的形成，能更好地了解布什政府内部关于阿富汗战争的相关决策机制。

有限的文献比较笼统地将该决策归结为美国政府为达成在阿富汗的特定目标所选择的一种合理手段。显然这些解释都是在理性决策模式理论框架下的推论。它们在很多问题上给出的解释模糊不清或者难以自圆其说。笔者认为这些在理性决策模式理论框架下对该决策做出的解释并没有很好地探究决策形成的原因，于是笔者决定从另一个角度切入该问题。

为了更好地理解美国2002年在阿富汗战场采取“轻脚印战略”的决策的形成过程，本文采用了官僚政治模式的理论视角来研究该问题。本文建构的官僚政治模式理论框架继承了格雷厄姆·艾利森的官僚政治理论研究框架，围绕四个关注点展开：参与决策的主要决策者、决策者在其中的立场、决策者拥有的权力及来源、和决策过程的展开。本文的理论框架与艾利森的理论框架一样强调部门本位主义在决策过程中的影响力。然而，本文回避了常常与官僚政治理论紧密联系的机构决定论，突出了在决策过程中起作用的人为因素，即决策过程中决策者所具备的个体能动性。另外，本文将传统的官僚政治研究与总统-顾问关系研究相结合，以完善官僚政治理论框架。

从官僚政治的角度看，本文认为美国于2002年做出的在后塔利班时代的阿富汗战场采取“轻脚印战略”的决策更多的是布什政府内部官僚政治博弈的结果，而非如理性决策模式所认为的是一个价值最大化的选项；同时本文发现在决策过程中，个人因素和系统因素同样重要。同时受到部门偏好和由过去经历及特定观念导致的个人偏好的影响，重要决策者，即鲍威尔、拉姆斯菲尔德、和赖斯，他们各自在该议题上的立场是符合期待的；在选择立场的过程中，各决策者的自主权不一，也就是说，个人偏好在其中的影响力不一，这是受到部门是否有一致意见和决策者个性两个因素的制约。决策者在政府部门的位置是他们在议题讨论中主导议题讨论方向的权力的主要来源。在这种权力的支持下，决策者积极地参与到一系列围绕具体事件展开的辩论中，这些辩论最终会导向美国在后塔利班时代的阿富汗战场采取“轻脚印战略”这一重要战略性决策。关于权力的来源，值得注意的另一点是，决策者们自身是否有意愿充分利用他们具有的谈判优势和他人是否认为决策者具有谈判优势并有意愿充分利用该优势也会影响到决策者主导议题的实际权力。在所有相关的辩论中，本文特别关注与两个事件相关的辩论，它们分别是2002年初国际安全援助部队扩张的可能性探讨和同年春帕查·汗·扎德兰挑战卡尔扎伊临时政府权威。决策者针对这两个事件美国所应采取的反应展开的辩论及结果促成了“轻脚印战略”的定型。决定采取“轻脚印战略”很大程度上符合拉姆斯菲尔德的期待。这主要由于拉姆斯菲尔德拥有更好的谈判筹码并且他本身是个坚持己见的用权者。然而，即使是拉姆斯菲尔德也需要做出让步以达成协议。在整个过程中，个人因素如性格、经历、观念，与系统因素如部门偏好和博弈规则，对最终决策的产生发挥同样重要的作用。

通过从官僚政治理论的角度去理解美国布什政府2002年在阿富汗战场采取“轻脚印战略”的决策，本文希望能第一，通过突出个体能动性在决策过程中起的作用以提高官僚政治理论对外交决策的解释力；第二，提供一个新的视角去理解阿富汗战争和美国外交决策机制。

 

关键词：阿富汗战争；轻脚印战略；官僚政治研究；个体能动性；美国外交决策

Abstract

The Afghanistan war has been dragging on for more than 18 years. The light footprint approach the US initially adopted in Afghanistan after removing the Taliban from power is sometimes blamed for resulting in the current state of the war, yet the reason why the approach was adopted has not received adequate attention. Actually, even if this decision was not partially responsible for the current state of the war, merely being the earliest strategic decision the US made for its role in the post-Taliban Afghanistan war is enough to make it a topic worthy of exploring, as it sheds light on the decision-making mechanism inside the Bush administration regarding the Afghanistan war.

The limited scholarship that touches upon the topic generally explains it away as a means to an end—a reasonably choice to achieve certain objective. Apparently those explanations were structured under the framework of the rational actor theory of decision-making. The author found those explanations far from satisfactory as they leave questions unanswered. Therefore, the author decided to approach the issue from another angle.

In order to understand the US decision to go light footprint in Afghanistan in 2002, the paper looks at the issue through a bureaucratic politics lens. The bureaucratic politics model the paper establishes inherits the analytical framework of Allison’s bureaucratic politics model which revolves around four focuses: decision-makers in the decision-making process, their stances, their power, and how the process unfolds that leads to the final decision. It also retains Allison’s model’s emphasis on parochialism. However, it rejects the institutional determinism that is easily associated with the bureaucratic politics analysis and instead highlights the human element at work in the decision-making process, specifically the individual agency decision-makers possess in making the decision. What’s more, it also refines the bureaucratic politics analysis by incorporating president-advisor analysis into the bureaucratic politics framework.

From the perspective of the bureaucratic politics, the paper finds that the US decision to adopt the light footprint approach as its strategy in the post-Taliban Afghanistan in 2002 was more of the result of the bureaucratic bargaining games that happened inside the Bush administration than a value-maximizing alternative as the rational actor theory suggests; and that personal factors play a role as significant as systemic factors in delivering the result. Under the influence of both institutional preference and personal preference resulting from past experience and personal beliefs, the respective stance key decision-makers, namely Powell, Rumsfeld, and Rice, picked was to be expected, though the degree of each decision-maker’s autonomy varies, and depends on the (non-)existence of institutional consensus and their personality. Backed by their power mainly endowed on them by their positions, they were engaged in a series of case-oriented debates that would eventually lead to the determination of the light footprint approach as the US strategy in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. It should be noted that their power can also be influenced by their willingness to make the best use of their bargaining advantage and their counterparts’ perception of their advantage and the effectiveness of their usage of advantage. Among all related debates, the paper specifically examines the debates about the US response to the ISAF expansion and the Pacha Khan Challenge. The light footprint approach was largely decided in favor of Rumsfeld, mainly because he possessed better bargaining chips and he was a willful power wielder. But even Rumsfeld had to make concessions to reach the deal. In the whole process, personal factors like personality, past experience and personal beliefs are as important as systemic factors like institutional preference and the rules of the game in delivering the decision.

Hopefully the paper would first, by highlighting the individual agency in the analysis, develop the bureaucratic politics analysis in a way that it could better explain the decision-making process; and second, provide a fresh perspective to understand the Afghanistan war and the US foreign policy decision-making mechanism.

 

Key words: the Afghanistan war; the light footprint approach; bureaucratic politics analysis; individual agency; the US foreign policy decision-making

 

[7] 苏协怡

导师姓名：李莉文

中文题目：美国对于《巴黎协定》的气候决策：基于双层博弈视角的分析

英文题目：Analysis of U.S. Policy on the Paris Agreement Based on the Two-Level Game Theory

摘要

美国总统奥巴马在其任期内始终公开表示积极应对气候变化，并在第二任期内签署《巴黎协定》，这一成就也被视为奥巴马政府的主要气候遗产。然而接任的特朗普总统在美国气候政策上“开倒车”，在上任的半年内即宣布退出《巴黎协定》，成功瓦解奥巴马政府的国际气候成果，体现了奥巴马政府气候遗产的脆弱性。本文围绕以下问题展开研究：奥巴马政府和特朗普政府在《巴黎协定》上的两次决策是如何促成的？

本文试图利用双层博弈理论解释奥巴马和特朗普两任美国总统在《巴黎协定》上所做出的截然相反的决定，从美国政府的视角分析其在国际和国内层面上的双层博弈，并且得出结论：双层博弈理论对美国在《巴黎协定》上的两次决策具有良好的解释力，且国际因素、国内因素和主要谈判者在两次决策中发挥了不同程度的作用。

双层博弈理论对奥巴马政府的气候决策具有良好解释力，且国际因素、国内因素和主要谈判者都在政府决策过程中发挥了重要作用。在国际层面上，奥巴马政府追求重塑美国在全球气候治理上的领导力，通过宣布《中美联合气候宣言》和承诺向绿色气候基金出资30亿美元释放积极信号，扩大与欧盟及发展中国家等主要参与国达成协议的可能性。在国内层面，奥巴马政府宣布《清洁电力计划》与国际气候行动相呼应，科技产业、清洁能源产业和环保团体的支持也在一定程度上促成了政府的国际行动。然而共和党控制的国会和传统能源行业对此持反对态度。面对国内阻力，作为主要谈判者，奥巴马采取“问题重新界定”及“协同问题联动”的策略来扩大国内的获胜集合，然而获胜集合仍不足以赢得国内批准。这也迫使奥巴马政府决定通过行政命令的方式加入《巴黎协定》，并未将该协定递交参议院批准。这一决定同时简化了退出程序，加强了这一成果的脆弱性。传统能源行业在反对无效之后，在2016年总统大选中转而支持共和党候选人，也为该协定的前景增加了不确定性。

双层博弈理论对于特朗普政府的退出决定同样具有良好的解释力。在这一决策过程中，国际因素发挥了次要作用，而国内因素和主要谈判者发挥了重要作用。在国际层面上，特朗普政府认为《巴黎协定》本身存在缺陷，并且在国际气候谈判中表现消极。后续的马拉喀什气候大会、波恩气候大会和G7峰会使得特朗普政府认识到该协定的根本性缺陷难以改变，重新谈判的可能性也微乎其微。特朗普政府的这一决定更大程度上反映了美国国内的博弈。特朗普政府的内阁组成成员多为气候怀疑论者，为了巩固基层选民的支持，重振美国经济和就业，特朗普政府逆转了上届政府的气候政策；国会的主流声音也敦促特朗普政府退出该协定。然而利益集团中支持留在该协定的声音占了上风，石油天然气行业与煤碳行业巨头逆转先前的态度，为了保留在全球未来能源行业的谈判话语权，加入科技产业、清洁能源产业和环保团体，共同呼吁特朗普政府留在《巴黎协定》。然而，作为主要谈判者，特朗普出于政治利益的考量，采取“问题重新界定”的策略缩小国内的获胜集合，并最终使用否决权退出了该协定。

此次退群并非美国政府第一次违背国际气候承诺，美国政府在未来的国际气候谈判中的行动和决策也可能再生变数。本文利用双层博弈理论试图研究两任政府在《巴黎协定》上的决策，并且分析两任政府决策背后国际和国内层面的复杂博弈和政治考量，而非将“退群”决定单纯归结于特朗普总统的“不确定性”，以期为美国政府在《巴黎协定》中的气候政策研究做出些许贡献，并为美国政府未来的国际气候行动提供借鉴。

 

关键词：美国气候政策 巴黎协定 双层博弈

Abstract

Since taking office, the U.S. President Barack Obama had been publicly active in tackling climate change, and reached the Paris Agreement in his second term, which is also seen as a major climate legacy of his administration. However, the successor President Trump reversed the U.S. climate policy and announced to dump this agreement within half a year of taking office. This exit successfully unraveled the international climate achievement of the Obama administration, demonstrating the fragility of the Obama administration’s climate legacy. This paper focuses on the following question: how did international and domestic factors contribute to the acceptance of the Paris Agreement under the Obama administration and the withdrawal from it under the Trump administration?

This paper tries to use two-level game theory to explain these two different decisions on this agreement and analyze the international and domestic bargains of the U.S in the two periods. This paper draws the conclusion that the two-level game theory demonstrates strong explanatory power for these two decisions, and domestic factors, international factors and the chief negotiators play roles in different degrees in two cases.

The two-level game theory shows strong explanatory power for President Obama’s decision to join the Paris Deal, and international factors, domestic factors and the chief negotiators all play important roles in the government decision-making process. At the international level, the Obama administration sought to restore the U.S. leadership in global climate governance, and sent positive signals to the international community by reaching the historic joint announcement with China and committing $3 billion to the Green Climate Fund, expanding the possibility of reaching agreements with other major participants such as the European Union and developing countries. At the domestic level, the Obama administrations proposed the Clean Power Plan, echoing its international climate action, and the support from the high-tech industry, the clean energy industry and environmental groups also pushed the progress of the U.S. international climate efforts. However, the Republican-controlled Congress and the traditional energy industries were opposed to the U.S involvement in the Paris Agreement. Facing domestic resistance, as the chief negotiator, President Obama adopted the strategy of “issue redefinition” and “synergistic issue linkage” to expand domestic win-sets. However, domestic win-sets were still not large enough to win the ratification from the Congress, forcing the Obama administration to join this agreement by executive order without submitting it to the Senate for approval. This decision also simplified the exit process and increased the vulnerability of this outcome. Moreover, after the opposing efforts turned in vain, the traditional energy industries switched to the Republican candidates in the 2016 presidential election, adding the uncertainty of the future of this agreement.

Moreover, the two-level game theory also shows strong explanatory power for President Trump’s repudiation of the deal. In this case, international factors play a minor role in the decision-making process, while domestic factors and the chief negotiators play important roles in contributing to the decision. At the international level, the Trump administration believed that the Paris agreement is flawed in essence and performed passively in international climate talks. Subsequent climate talks in Marrakesh, Bonn and the G7 summit have made the Trump administration realize that the fundamental flaws in the agreement are hard to change and that renegotiation is highly unlikely. This decision reflects more of a domestic game. The Trump administration, which has a cabinet of mostly climate skeptics, has reversed the previous administration’s climate policies in an effort to shore up support among grassroots voters and revive the U.S. economy and employment. The mainstream voices in Congress have also urged the Trump administration to pull out of the deal. Yet, supportive interest groups standing on the “staying” side had the upper hand. In order to maintain the negotiating power in global energy matrix, the oil and gas industry and coal industry giants reversed their attitudes and joined the high-tech industry, clean energy industry and environmental groups, calling for the government to remain in the Paris Agreement. However, the chief negotiator, namely President Trump, adopted the strategy of “issue redefinition” to reduce domestic win-sets and eventually used the veto power to dump the agreement with the consideration of political interests.

This withdrawal is not the first time for the U.S. government to renege on international climate commitments, and its actions and decisions in future international climate negotiations can be thrown into doubt. This paper analyzes two government decisions on the Paris agreement with two-level game theory and digs out complicated game and political considerations, rather than put all blame for this exit on the “unpredictability” of President Trump. This paper hopes to make some contribution to the climate policy study of the U.S. government on the Paris Agreement and offer reference for the future U.S. international climate action.

 

Key words: U.S. climate policy  Paris Agreement  two-level game theory